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Piracy is known as a maritime problem for thousands of years, indeed as long as ships
were sailing through oceans and maritime trade has been existed between countries. It has
a long term history in the international maritime system as it can be guessed that piracy has
existed as long as the oceans were plied for commerce1. Also today, Piracy is still alive in
the modern world2. The popular modern picture of pirates sees them as rebellious, cool and
clever teams who operate outside the restricting bureaucracy of modern life.  This picture
is supported and intensified by romantic literature (“Treasure Island” by Robert Louis
Stevenson) or adventure Hollywood movies (“Pirates of the Caribbean” by Disney Motion
Pictures) showing pirates as funny weird and sympathetic heroes following in their deep
heart just the good and best. The same view can be shared when we look on piracy from a
historically perspective. In the past, countries favored pirates because they aided their
home country by targeting the travel routes of other countries. But as soon as the trade
relations between countries strengthened, pirates began to be seen as nuisances rather than
heroes. The more the trade relations strengthened, the picture of piracy changed and
countries began fighting against it3.
Also in the modern world of today, Pirates are not romantic figures4. In the contrary,
modern-day piracy is a violent, bloody and ruthless practice5 and has nothing in common
with the picture shown in modern literature or movies. Modern pirates use for their attacks
small speedboats supported by high class mother-ships as well as rocket launchers at the
ships’ hull.
They are equipped with the most current and new high-technology systems, machine guns,
                                               
1 Joshua Michael Goodwin, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to
Part [notes], In: Vand. J. Transnational L., Vol. 39, (2006), at 977.
2 Timothy H. Goodman, Leaving the Corsair’s Name to Other Times – How to enforce the
law of the Sea Piracy in the 21st Century through regional international agreements, In:
Case West. Reserv. Journ. of Int’l L, Vol. 31, (1999), at 139; Philipp Wendel, State
Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public International Law,
Springer Verlag, (2007), at 17; Rainer, Piraterie und widerrechtliche Handlungen gegen die
Sicherheit der Seeschiffahrt, In: Ipsen, Jörn (ed.) Recht – Staat – Gemeinwohl: Festschrift für
Dietrich Rauschning, C. Heymanns Verlag, (2001), at 501-505.
3 Joshua Michael Goodwin, supra note 1, at 980 f.
4 Katie Smith Matison, The Big Business of Maritime Piracy and the Modern Corsair: Dead
Men Tell no Tales, In: Journal of Transport, Law, Logistics and Policy, Vol. 76, (2009), at 372.
5 Jayant Abhyankar, Contemporary Piracy, In: BIMCO Bulletin, (October 1996), at 58.
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bombs, GPS navigation systems, mobile phones, small radar sets, and high quality
telescopes6. The tactics of them are sophisticated and aggressive. Modern-day pirates are
acting like organized criminals. Whereas in the past pirates tended to board ships to steal
money or valuable items of cargo, today they hijack vessels and steal the entire vessel and
cargoes, the crews will be killed or set adrift, the vessel will be renamed and its distinctive
marks will be repainted at sea to create a so-called “phantom ship”. Pirates prepare also
registration documents and bills of lading so that the hijacked cargo and the vessel can be
sold7. The hijacking of ships and cargoes (not for money, but for political reasons) links
pirates with terrorists8. There is an overlap in piracy and terrorist’ activities. This trend
started with the “Achille Lauro” incident in 1985. Thereby, Palestinian terrorists boarded
the Italian vessel “Achille Lauro” in Egyptian territorial waters and threatened to kill the
passengers unless fifty Palestinians held in Israel were released. During the seizure of the
ship a wheel-chair-bound American-Jew was murdered9. The 9/11 attacks increased this
trend and new genre of maritime terrorism.
This master thesis will examine whether the existing legal regulations and jurisdictions do
combat these developments of modern day piracy as it is a matter of urgency to decrease
piracy incidents and the upcoming threat of maritime terrorism. It will be considered
whether the existing regulations cover all acts of modern-day piracy, and whether universal
jurisdiction recognized under international law for piracy also covers terrorism on sea10.
Another question of this thesis is, whether there is an effective anti-piracy enforcement
existing. The current developments of piracy acts seem to require a more effective
worldwide enforcement regulation and authority. Such authority could maybe be
implemented by establishing an international juridical body for piracy. This master thesis
will examine whether such an international juridical body could be implemented from a
legal point of view and how it can be structured.
                                               
6 George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International
Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, In: Tulane Law Review, Vol. 81, (June 2007), at 1435;
Graham Gerard Ong, Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia, In: Viewpoints:
Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS), (November 29, 2002) at 3.
7 Report of the UN Secretary General: Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/56/58 (9
March 2001), at 179-180.
8 Strati, Gavouneli & Skourtos, Unresolved Issues and New Challenges to the Law of the Sea
- Time Before and Time After, Vol. 54, (2006), at 175.
9 Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, In: 82 AJIL 1988, at 289.
10 Angelos M. Syrigos, Developments on the Interdiction of Vessels on the High Seas, Vol.
54, Leiden, (2006), at 176.
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 1.1 Legal Sources and Methods
This master thesis can be characterized as a thesis in international criminal maritime and
enforcement laws. It examines international Laws of the Sea as well as international and
national criminal jurisdiction and enforcement measures against piracy. The main legal
questions within this thesis are whether the existing international and national regulations
are sufficient and effective enough to combat the increasing threat of modern day piracy
and the new genre of maritime terrorism. The changing nature of today’s maritime piracy
requires the existing regulations to be flexible and dynamic.
Therefore, this thesis shall discover the existing law to combat the modern-day piracy acts
and terror on sea. As well, it should be sorted out what kind of possibilities and proposals
are in discussion by scholars and legal regimes to improve the enforcement activities and
prosecution against piracy and terror on sea to effectively decrease them.
The relevant legal sources are treaties and different soft law instruments. Here, the
Convention on the High Seas11, LOS Convention12 as well as the SUA Convention13 with
its amended Protocol14 do apply. There are as well several regional non-binding soft law
treaties on piracy implemented by regional legal regimes and the IMO (International
Maritime Organization) as well as by the IMB (International Maritime Bureau). These soft
law treaties are as well a relevant source with regards to the topic of this master thesis. Soft
law treaties are non-binding legal regulations, but they are important and significant with
regards to interpretation of existing hard law regulations and instruments like LOS
Convention or SUA Convention. As well it has to be kept in mind that soft law treaties can
be implemented into hard law treaties. Therefore, soft law treaties with regards to piracy
will influence the direction of political discussions as well as about possible
implementation of hard law regulations in the future.
Besides, with regards to interpretation of these regulations, the common principles as
regulated in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
                                               
11 Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958.
12 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982.
13 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 10 March 1988.
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Convention15) do apply. Article 31 thereby gives fundamental guidance how to interpret
treaties. In relation to the Vienna Convention and the interpretation of piracy laws,
especially the Draft Convention on Piracy prepared by the Harvard Research in
International Law (Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy16) has to be taken into account.
This Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy is a valuable collection of sources of any
research in the international law of piracy. Although this convention has never been
adopted, its impact upon the development of the law of piracy is unquestioned.
As well, case law influences existing hard law regulations and its interpretation. The
problem of existing gaps in international law about piracy can best be examined with the
case of the Belgian action against Greenpeace17. In this case a Belgian court ruled that the
Greenpeace vessel Sirius had committed an “act of piracy” when it tried to prevent two
Belgian vessels from dumping toxic waste in the North Sea. That was the only major case
since implementation of UNCLOS that has been brought under the piracy provisions of the
Convention on the High Seas or of the UNCLOS18. And the “pirates” have not even been
“real pirates” but “just” the international association of Greenpeace. Case law can show in
this regards the legal gaps which are existing in relation to effective piracy laws and piracy
jurisdiction and can be used as guidance with regards to interpretation.
1.2 Summary of the Problem from a Global Perspective
The act of “piracy” is a criminal offence and consists of criminal acts of violation,
detention, rape or depredation. The increasing and upcoming threat of maritime piracy and
sea robbery is currently the biggest challenge the international maritime security has to
                                                                                                                                             
14 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 01 November 2005.
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969.
16 Draft Convention on Piracy prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law,
Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Codification of International Law (pt. 4
Piracy), In: 26 AM J. Int’l. L 740, (supp.1983), at 743.
17 M.S. Wady Tanker, M.S. Sirius N.V. Mabeco, N.V. Parfin v. 1 J. Castle 2 Neth. Stichting
Sirius, 20 Eur. Trans. Law. 536 (June 12, 1985); Castle John and Neth. Stichting Sirius v. Nv
Marjlo and N.V. Parfin, 77 Int’l Law Rev. 537, (Dec. 19, 1986).
18 Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the Pirate ?:
Environmentalism, Piracy, and the Development of International Law, In: 24 Cal. W. Int’l L.J.
,(1993), at 2.
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face with19. Acts on piracy are dramatically on the rise20.  Thereby, most disturbing seems
to be the “growing nexus between maritime crime, terror organizations and failed or failing
states”21. Piracy of today threatens not only economic interests, but also peoples live.
Admiral Arun Prakash, Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy, mentioned in a commentary in
2005:
“As things get hotter for the terrorists on land, I think it is quite logical that they will move
seawards. So, there is potential for tremendous trouble at sea. It is likely to happen unless
we work together on preemptive actions”22.
Also the U.N. General Assembly responded to the increased threat of piracy and urged
“all states… to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and combat
incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea…and bring the alleged perpetrators to justice,
in accordance with international law”23.
Modern-Day piracy is not anymore just lead by the intention of getting cash or becoming
rich, but is focusing on social interests and motivated by political ideas thereby willing not
just to threaten economic interests but also people’s live. Today, such kind of piracy is
called “political piracy” or “maritime terrorism”. It is experienced that even Al-Qaeda has
turned its sights to the seas by using vessels filled with explosives. They are known as the
so-called “Al-Qaeda-Navy”24. The German Newspaper FAZ reported in January 2011, that
the Islamic militia in Somalia does not only tolerate (they even tax) modern-day piracy, but
also have called for a “Sea-Dschihad” against the international trade shipping25.
Today’s pirates are often trained fighters and piracy on the high sea is becoming a key
tactic of terrorist groups having an ideological bent and a broad political agenda26. The
likelihood for worldwide media coverage of an incident makes maritime terrorism an even
                                               
19 Philipp A. Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a Revised Definition of
Maritime Piracy, In: Int’l Trade L.J., Vol. 8, (1999) at 61.
20 Timothy H. Goodman, supra note 2, at 141.
21 John I. Winn & Kevin H. Govern, Maritime Pirates, Sea Robbers and Terrorists: New
Approaches to Emerging Threats, Maritime Pirates, Sea Robbers and Terrorists: New
Approaches to Emerging Threats, In: Homeland Security Rev., Vol. 2, (2008), at 132.
22 Ibid at 131.
23 G.A. Res. 32, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., ¶22, U.N. Doc. A/53/L.35 (1998),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/a53135e.htm.
24George D. Gabel, supra note 6, at 1437 f.
25Stephan Löwenstein, Eskalation am Horn von Afrika, In: FAZ as of February 01, 2011, No.
26.
26 Luft & Korin, Terrorism goes to the Sea, In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83., No. 6 (2004), at 61.
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more attractive prospect27. With the upcoming and increasing threat of maritime terrorism
and its overlapping with what was known in the past as piracy, there is a huge danger for
energy markets as most of the world’s oil and gas is shipped through the world’s most
piracy-infested waters.
There is still neither an international maritime peacekeeping force nor an international
tribunal with jurisdiction to punish pirates. When the German vessel “Beluga Nomination”
was captured in January 2011 by pirates in the Indian Ocean, no state felt responsible and
sent any help to the vessel. After the release of the vessel, the ship-owner, Niels Stolberg,
sent a report to all possible responsible observation and military units, he did not get any
reply28. Same experiences have been made by several other international shipping
companies which started to organize and protect themselves as the international
community does not feel responsible and seems to be helpless in such kind of situations.
The problem from a global perspective is the regional and international cooperation with
respect to greater efforts towards coordinated anti-piracy patrols and enforcement
measures. For example, the European Union launched its operation “Atlanta” to combat
piracy off the coast of Somalia29 while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
also taken the lead in providing naval support. Several states like China, India, Iran,
Malaysia and Russia offered their support30. But, these responses of the international
community are diverse and it seems to be a challenge to coordinate that kind of
enforcement activities, as there is neither yet a global international obligation for states to
combat piracy on sea nor an international action force against piracy or maritime terrorism
in place.
                                               
27 Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, In: Oregon Review of Int’l L., Vol. 8, (2006)
at 133.
28 Johannes Ritter, Im Gespräch: Niels Stolberg, geschäftsführender Gesellschafter der
Bremer Reederei Beluga Shipping GmbH, In: FAZ as of February 01, 2011, No. 26, at 15.
29 “Operation Atlanta” is conducted through the European Union-led naval force
“EUNAVFOR”. EUNAVFOR patrols the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia to arrest,
detain and transfer suspected pirates to the Republic of Kenya for prosecution.
30 Donald R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, (2010) at 164.
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1.3 The Effects of Modern-Day Piracy
The impact of the modern-day piracy is enormous and considerable on international
economies. It is a worldwide phenomenon thereby concentrating for the most part in
several specific regions of the world (e.g. Somalia, Cape Horn, Straits of Malacca,
Indonesian archipelago, Malaysia, the waters of Southeast Asia including the South China
Sea, Thailand and the Philippines) of which are all extremely important locations for
maritime commerce. With an increasingly globalised world and international marketplace,
such acts do no longer affect just one country at a time31.
Maritime trade is heavily affected by this development. While the damage to one particular
vessel and the owing shipping company by an act of piracy might be very limited (but
expensive), consequences for the economic development of whole regions and of the long-
term reaction of shipping companies have to be taken into account. For example, Somalia’s
development and political instability will be hampered by the fact that shipping companies
steer clear of its coastline and avoid routes around it32. This is very cost effective for
shipping companies as they have to take into account longer transportation routes. That
leads again to higher freight and the higher freight to higher prices paid by the end
consumer. Furthermore, the insurers are already raising their premiums if a vessel of a
shipping company regularly passes through these areas. Some insurance companies
classify vessels passing constantly through “dangerous waters” with a “war risk” and
therefore with a high premium33. Another consequence is that insurers require shippers to
avoid certain important routes in maritime commerce based upon a so-called “war risk
clause” that excludes those geographical regions from coverage34.
Therefore, many shipping companies do not report incidents of piracy for fear of raising
their insurance premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming investigations35. It is
estimated that the total damage caused by piracy – due to losses of ships and cargo and to
                                               
31 Ryan Olson, International Piracy Laws and the Birth of Maritime Terrorism, In: Maritime
Law Bulletin, 15, at 17.
32 Philipp Wendel, supra note 2, at 20.
33 Ibid.
34 Christopher M. Douse, Combating Risk on the High Sea: An Analysis of the Effects of
Modern Piratical Acts on the Marine Insurance Industry, In: Tulane Maritime Law Journal,
2010, at 287- 288.
35 Luft & Korin, supra note 26, at 62.
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rising insurance costs – to date amounts to 16 billion US-Dollars per year36. Also, the
proceeds of a captured vessel have increased, whereas it was in 2009 between one to two
million US-Dollars, the gains for a captured vessel became in 2010 three million US-
Dollars37.
The traumatic events of September 11, 2001 have exposed the vulnerability of the global
transport infrastructure both as a potential target for terrorist activities and a potential
weapon of mass destruction. Consequently, any act of piracy or maritime terrorism could
multiply if an attack would disrupt traffic in a major port or in an important shipping route.
For example, in the Straits of Malacca, there are approximately 55.000,00 vessels passing
through every year representing about 80 percent of the total oil transport to China, Japan
and South Korea and 40 percent of global trade38. The fear that ships carrying fuel or
chemical cargoes could be hijacked and used in indiscriminate terrorist attacks is rightly
growing. This threat is disturbing the world’s seagoing states, especially in relation to the
vulnerability of oil tankers.
As mentioned above, it is assumed that the majority of incidents of piracy go unreported as
many ship-owners hesitate to report because they are afraid of higher insurance premiums
as well as of a loss in their reputation and image as shipping company and hauler39.
Furthermore, some piracy acts against small local crafts may be not reported due to fear of
reprisal.
Another reason of “non-reporting” are the enormous costs which arise while maintaining
the ship in a port during a protracted investigation that may prove futile and followed by its
consequence of delay in movement of cargo. A report of a piracy attack is estimated to cost
a ship-owner about 25.000,00 US Dollars per day40. That is why ship-owners are today
very reluctant to involve their ships in costly delays.
                                               
36 Ibid.
37 Stephan Löwenstein, supra note 25.
38 Philipp Wendel, supra note 2, at 20.
39National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers, In the firing line (2004),
at 2; Leticia Diaz/Barry Hart Dubner, On the Problem of Utilizing Unilateral Action to Prevent
Acts of Sea Piracy and Terrorism: A Proactive Approach to the Evolution of International
Law, In: 32 Syracuse J. Int’l L & Com. (2004), pp. 1 et seq., at 26.
40 Katie Smith Matison, supra note 4, at 372.
11
As well, there is evidence of coastal state under-reporting of incidents. While some states
may simply not be aware of all incidents that occur, others may be reluctant to concede
that there are any well-grounded concerns about the safety of maritime traffic off their
coasts41. As in certain regions, the states are reluctant to enforce piracy or their security
forces do not have the required capacity, only a vessel can guarantee its own maritime
security42. Ship crews have started to arm themselves or employ private escorts for cargo
vessels43. One of these private escorts, the private company “Naval Guards” declares that
there is a big demand for them. Their service can be booked for 5.000,00 to 12.000,00 US
Dollars per day44.
Additionally, to strengthen the maritime security system, as of July 2004, the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) was adopted. The ISPS contains detailed
mandatory security requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies
as well as a series of non-mandatory guidelines regarding the implementation of these
requirements. Besides others, the ISPS requires ships above 500 tons to be equipped with
alarm systems that silently transmit security alerts containing tracking information in case
of emergency45. Certainly, these technical frameworks for ensuring that ships are rendered
as safe as possible from piracy or terrorist attacks do not guarantee that such attacks will
not occur. Hence, only effective legal regulations as well as enforcement laws and
jurisdiction can help to solve the problem in the future.
2 Assessment of existing Legal Regulations against Modern-Day Piracy
Although it is a well-known principle of sovereignty that each state has universal
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates, the above mentioned preponderance of attacks near states
that lack resources to effectively prosecute pirates create a gap within the international
                                               
41 Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge University
Press, (2009), at 51.
42 In Somalia, no effective government exists and hence, no governmental patrol boats
are controlling its coastal waters. The transitional government could only urge neighboring
states to send warships to patrol Somalian waters.
43 Aleksandr Antonovic Kovalev, Contemporary issues of the Law of the Sea, Utrecht:
eleven, 2004, at 148.
44 Gerd F. Michelis, In: Yacht 11/2011, Somalisches Roulette, at 52.
45 Luft & Korin, supra note 26, at 68.
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cooperation framework46. Piracy is a crime under both - the municipal law of individual
states and a crime under international law. The following chapter will examine the
discrepancy in the offense of piracy under international and national laws and how this
offense is actually prosecuted and punished under domestic laws of coastal states.
Furthermore, essential existing legal regulations with regards to piracy will be examined
and the possible gaps within these regulations will be identified and discussed.
2.1 Existing Legal Regulations from an International Perspective
Several United Nations instruments address the problem of piracy. The most important are
the Convention on the High Seas47, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS
Convention or UNCLOS)48 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)49 with its Protocol of
200550.
Besides, these conventions, in the last years, several regional regulations were established
in areas of great concern to combat piracy from a regional perspective. The “Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Prevention and Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)” has been adopted by 16 Southeast Asian states. Under
this Agreement, an anti-piracy center was set up in Singapore which is gathering
information on piracy acts and shares that with other state parties51. Furthermore, several
regional institutions and authorities like the Comite’ Maritime International (CMI), the
Baltic and International Maritime Counsel (BIMCO), the International Chamber of
shipping (ICS), Interpol, the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I), the ICC
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
the United Nations (Office of Legal Affairs/Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
                                               
46 Diana Chang, Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates, In: 33 Boston College
International & Comparative Law Review, 2010, at 273.
47 Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958.
48 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982.
49 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation.
50 Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 01 November 2005.
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Sea)  have started to publish their own anti-piracy regulations. Whereby these regulations
are soft-law regulations and non-binding, it has to be mentioned that its establishment can
influence existing hard law conventions and give guidance for further legal developments.
But along with these various international conventions and soft law treaties that have come
about in the last years, the question is still whether these regulations are addressing all
legal problems to combat modern-day piracy and terrorism on sea.
2.2 Identifying Gaps in International Laws
According to these concerns, it is questionable whether there is international piracy law in
place that can properly contend with the current level of modern-day piracy and terror on
sea52. The following chapter will examine the most important international anti-piracy
regulations like Article 101 of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention with its supplemented
Protocol and will clarify whether they encompass modern-day piracy and terror on sea or
whether there are legal gaps in these regulations.
2.2.1 Definition of Modern-Day Piracy
An important question with regards to the crime of piracy itself is whether the existing
definition of piracy in international regulations applies to the changing nature of today’s
maritime piracy. There is one certainty in international law, and that is that, pirates are
treated in the same way like terrorists: “As enemies of mankind53”. Most authorities
describe piracy as actions at sea that would be punishable as robberies if committed on dry
land54.
                                                                                                                                             
51 Rothwell & Stephens, supra note 30, at 23; ReCAAP Info. Sharing Centre, About ReCAAP
ISC, http://www.recaap.org/about/about1_2thml.
52 Ryan Olson, supra note 31, at 19.
53 Luft & Korin, supra note 26, at 68.
54 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, In: Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 45, (2004) at 191.
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As the definition of piracy in Article 15 of the 1958 Convention of the High Seas has been
largely duplicated in 1982 in Article 101 at the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (LOS Convention)55, this thesis will examine Article 101 of LOS Convention
instead of Article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 101 of the
LOS Convention defines piracy as
“a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
   or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or
(b)56.”
According to this provision in the LOS Convention, there are three main conditions that
must be met before an incident can be characterized as an act of piracy: 1) It has to be
determined whether the act occurred on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of all
states57, 2) The aggressors must have attacked the vessel from another vessel and 3)
“private ends” must have been the sole motivation58.
According to this wording, it seems like that definition does not reach actions of those
actors who attack ships and their passengers for political ends (like the Achille Lauro
incident). It is questionable whether maritime terrorists who usually have a political goal
are covered by Article 101 of the LOS Convention.
Furthermore, if a piracy act occurs within the territorial sea, this would not be “piracy” as
defined in international law59. But official statistics reveal that most incidents of today’s
piracy occur within territorial and port waters60. Another requirement of Article 101 which
                                               
55 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982;  Philipp A. Buhler,
supra note 19, at 67;  Alfred P. Rubin, Revising the Law of Piracy, In: Cal. West.Int’l L.
Journal, Vol. 21., (1990) at 136 .
56 Article 101 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982.
57 Carlo Tiribelli, supra note 27, at 137; Strati, Gavouneli & Skourtos, supra note 8, at 118.
58 Ibid.
59 Rothwell & Stephens, supra note 30, at 162.
60 2000 Annual Report, IMO Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
MSC/Circ. 1991, March 31, 2001.
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does not seem to apply to modern-day piracy is that more than one ship has to be involved
in the action and that at least one of the ships is a pirate ship or a ship without national
character61. A mutiny by the shipping crew itself or a hijacking by passengers (like it
occurred in the Achille Lauro incident) thus would – if the wording of Article 101 should
be interpreted strict - not constitute piracy. How Article 101 of the LOS Convention has to
be understood and interpreted in modern times will be part of the next chapter of this
thesis.
In the contrary to the LOS Convention, the IMB defines piracy and armed robbery at sea in
more modern terms as:
“An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit
theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act”62.
Consequently, the IMB (International Maritime Bureau) definition covers acts of piracy
within internal and territorial waters. Furthermore, the IMB’s view is that piracy does not
necessarily need to be undertaken from another vessel or aircraft or requires the “private
ends” motivation. The IMB attempt was to broaden the definition of piracy to encompass
the practical changes in the nature of today’s piracy.
The same attempt was followed by the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)63 which entered into force 1992.
The SUA avoids the word “piracy” itself to broaden the entire definition of it as well as for
maritime terrorism. According to Article 3 para 1 of SUA
“1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other
form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely
to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
                                               
61 Article 101 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982; George
Constantinople, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, In: Virginia
Journal of Int’l L., Vol.26, (1986), at 734.
62 International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships, 2002, Annual Report (2003).
63 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation.
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(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or
its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering
the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted
commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f)64.”
According to the SUA “definition”, piracy is not limited to criminal actions on the high
seas but also focuses on criminal actions during international transits, in ports, coastal
zones or territorial waters65. Also, SUA does not make any distinction between private,
commercial or political motivations66. Whether this regulation is enough to encompass all
occurring piracy and maritime terrorist acts of today is questionable and will be part of the
research under chapter 2.2.3 of this master thesis. Furthermore, it is questionable whether
the definition of piracy in the SUA Convention and from the IMB implies that the
definition of Article 101 of UNCLOS must be interpreted in a different way in the light of
legal development.
2.2.2 Article 101 of UNCLOS
There have been many discussions about the legal wording of Article 101 of UNCLOS
(respectively Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas) and there is still the open
legal question how this Article should be interpreted and whether it captures also the new
development of piracy activities as described in the foregoing chapter of this thesis67.
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Thereby, there are three key questions that need to be answered in order to establish the
scope of Article 101 and whether it covers modern-day piracy and terror on sea. These key
questions relate to the wording of Article 101 as described under Chapter 2.2.1. The first
question is the requirement of “private-ends” and how this can be interpreted, the second
question is the interpretation of the “one-ship, two-ship – requirement” (also called “one-
ship, two-ship-dilemma”) and the third question is how the “high seas” requirement of
Article 101 can be understood68.
In the first instance, the private-ends requirement of Article 101 will be discussed. The
private-ends requirement 
(“any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends69”)
covers piracy acts which are committed due to private gains or private reasons like
hijacking a ship and reselling it as phantom ship, and thereby appears to exclude attacks by
maritime terrorists because of their public motivation. But a strict interpretation of this
wording “private ends” would already be problematic as no one usually knows the
motivation of pirates when they capture a vessel. Or how would you know that pirates
attacking a ship are those motivated by political ideals and are part of a group of extremists
who intent on causing an economic downturn in the maritime markets ?70
If the private ends requirement of Article 101 of UNCLOS would exclude such an attack
as the Achille Lauro incident which was politically motivated or attacks on ships by
environmental extremists, these criminal activities could not be enforced by UNCLOS as
they would not be a “piracy action” as defined in Article 10171. Therefore, terrorists on sea
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like described in the first chapter, who usually have a political goal, would be
automatically excluded from the consideration of piracy as defined in Article 101. In case
the regulation in this Article was restricted only to acts motivated by personal gains, any
other motivation – especially a political one – precludes piracy being committed72. The
question is whether it was the intention to exclude such activities from the crime of piracy.
UNCLOS does not define what is actually meant under “private ends”, nor did the
Convention on the High Seas. As there is no definition existing, the wording, respectively
the objective, of the “private ends”-requirement in Article 101 has to be interpreted
according to international laws. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention) provides general rules for the interpretation of treaties like
UNCLOS. Thereby Article 31 para 1 of the Vienna Convention states that
“a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in the context and in the light of its object and purpose73.”
To examine the “object and purpose” of Article 101, it has to be looked back to the history
of its creation. The requirement of “private ends” in Article 101 has historical roots74. As
mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, in the past, pirates were not always frowned upon.
States used pirates to protect themselves against enemies respectively other states75. Due to
this historical picture of pirates, some scholars argue, that it is the very nature of piracy,
that pirates must not be acting for any recognized state and therefore, any incident with
political intention is excluded even if pirates are not acting for a state directly, but for their
own political goals76. But it was never expressly suggested by anyone in the past, that the
”private ends” requirement would exempt terrorist acts or that kind of modern day piracy
occurring today.
Article 31 para 2 of the Vienna Convention requires an interpretation of treaties with
regards to
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“a) any instrument relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty77.”
As the existing international regulations for piracy have been heavily influenced,
established and developed by the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy prepared by the
Harvard Research in International Law, this Draft Convention has to be examined as
source of Article 101 as well as with its background and the intention of its writers78. It can
be said that the Harvard Draft Convention is the “cornerstone” of the existing international
piracy laws79. The most relevant Article 3 for piracy definition within the Harvard Draft
Convention on Piracy reads as follows:
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts, committee in a place not within the territorial
jurisdiction of any state:
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound,
enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private
ends without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim or right, provided that the act is
connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected
with an attack which starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is
involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character.
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts
which make it a pirate ship.
3. An act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described in paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2 of this Article80.”
But similar like UNCLOS, neither the Harvard Draft does provide a definition, what a
“private act” exactly is or what “private ends” means81. Within this wording of the Harvard
Draft, the writers already adopted the private ends requirement and excluded from the
definition of piracy all piracy acts committed for political or other public ends82. This
intention is based on the before mentioned history of piracy, as acts of political groups or
acts of insurgency and states should be excluded83. The writers thereby ignored the fact
that there can be differences in the degree of state involvement and in the very nature of
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political groups and their acts84. During the area while writing the Harvard Draft, the
exclusion of political activities made sense. Piracy was only a concern as it interfered with
commercial shipping and transportation85. But it is clear that they did not want to limit
piracy to acts with intent to rob. It may be agreed that the threat of international peace and
stability could be of grave significance, if a state whose interests have not been directly
infringed, sought to punish a state which authorized an act of piracy86. Therefore, it is
reasonable to opt for the rule that state acts will not be within the definition of piracy but
this should not mean that all acts having political goals would be excluded. But in my
opinion, it seems like the writers of the Harvard Draft failed to include a definition of
piracy which would meet the political and social needs of the late twentieth century – just
because they did not know these problems as the worldwide community has not yet to deal
with them - when the Harvard Draft was created. Therefore, I agree with the legal writer
George Constantinople who states that the drafters of the Harvard Draft gave no attention
to acts of violence committed on the high seas for public ends, and thus they ignored the
possible threat that organized insurgents, national liberation organizations and their splinter
groups, informal groups and isolated individuals would attack and seize ships on the high
seas87.
Therefore, according to the intention and the purpose of that wording in the Harvard Draft,
I believe, that it is mistaken to assess that the writers deliberately wanted to exclude piracy
acts with a political intention. It can be agreed with Douglas Guilfoyle’s opinion that, if the
wording of “private ends” will be understood so that a political motive could exclude an
act from the definition of piracy, it is to mistake the applicable concept of “public” and
“private” acts88.
As well, when looking at the later definitions of piracy which came up in the SUA
Convention and in the IMB definition, it can be agreed that at the present, the traditional
definition of piracy and interpretation of private ends in UNCLOS is too narrow to meet
the prevailing political and social needs with regards to the international fight against
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piracy89. The wording of “private ends” has to be understood and interpreted as “private
acts” or “private interests”, so that all acts of violence that lack state sanction are acts
undertaken “for private ends”90. Based upon this inclusion of political motive for private
gains of pirates, the private ends requirement of Article 101 UNCLOS shall be interpreted
with an extension to acts of terrorism on the sea91. This view of interpretation seems to be
right.
Another deficiency involved the Article 101 definition’s requirement that the act derive
from one vessel attacking another
(“[…] and directed: […], against another ship”92),
leaving unanswered the question of whether internal seizures (like again the Achille Lauro
incident) would qualify under the definition93. This problem is called the “one-ship, two-
ship dilemma”94. Thus, two vessels are necessary for the perpetration of piracy95. The
wording seems to exclude crew seizures or passenger takeovers of vessels from the
concept of piracy as only a single ship would be involved in such cases96. For an act of
terrorism to also be an act of piratical aggression, the attackers must have attacked the
vessel “from another vessel”97. As described in the first chapter, modern day piracy often
occurs by hijacking vessels (its cargo or passengers/crew) and selling them as phantom
ships again. In an age when luxury liners and cruise ships carry passengers from many
nations, threats of attack are as likely to come from within a ship as they are from without
it98.  Therefore, to meet as well the modern-day forms of piracy, the definition of piracy
should include as piratical attacks as well attacks against a ship without requiring the
involvement of “another vessel”. Some scholars – especially Diana Chang - argue that this
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would not make sense as it would mean to expand the UNCLOS definition of piracy to
political terrorism and mutiny99. Chang believes that this would be ineffective as these
have different root causes and different solutions than piracy does. Terrorists would
typically seek to draw attention to a cause regardless of whether the offenders profit from
the attack, while pirates are solely motivated by profit and seek to avoid attention100.
As I see it, this interpretation is not a correct view. First, from a practical point of view, the
activities of pirates and terrorists on sea overlap and the incidents merge into one another.
Terrorists are, like pirates, civilians who are not associated with a country, but through fear
or panic, attack other civilians for purely personal gain101. Second, all acts of maritime
terrorism should be tried to enforce by the existing legal regulations without exception
whatsoever, because they run contrary to the fundamental human rights of life, liberty and
security. And third, when looking back at the wording of Article 101, the definition further
elaborates under b) that piracy also may consist of participating “in the operation of a ship
[…] with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship”102. With regards to this wording and
due to a contextual interpretation, the wording “against another vessel” should be
interpreted to also include takeovers by insiders103.
Also with regards to the rules of interpretation of Article 31 para 2 of the Vienna
Convention, looking back to the Harvard Draft to the “one-ship, two-ship-dilemma”, the
intention for the wording of Article 3 in the Harvard Draft, which includes the wording of
“another vessel” as well, was to follow the rules of customary international laws regarding
flag state jurisdiction104. As pirates neither belong to a state nor organized political society,
the regulation in the Harvard Draft wanted to ensure that no state or nation has more right
of control over pirates or more responsibility for their doings than another105. Therefore,
writers of the Harvard draft stated that a criminal act done by a part of the crew or
                                               
99 Diana Chang, supra note 46, at 282.
100 Rosemary Collins & Daud Hassan, Applications and Shortcomings of the Law of the Sea
in Combating Piracy: A South East Asian Perspective, In: 40 J.Mar.L. & Com.89, (2009), at
100; Diana Chang, supra note 46, at 282; Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea – The
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, In: 15, U. Miami
Int’L & Comp. L. Rev., 2008, 337, at 343.
101 Strati, Gavouneli & Skourtos, supra note 8, at 115.
102 Article 101 (a)(i) United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea, 10 December 1982.




passengers of the vessel itself should be treated as piracy when the revolt is directed
against the vessel106.
Certainly, it can be agreed that Article 101 contains a legal gap in here (like already with
the “private ends requirement”) and this gap can just be filled by interpretation. But it
cannot be agreed with some legal writers that there was the intention to limit Article 101
and to restrict any broader interpretation of its wording and to limit its expansion as well to
the hijacking cases and terrorism on sea. Especially, as long as there is no further separate
and detailed international regulation and definition taking this up.
It is also necessary to examine the requirement set out in Article 101 that the act must take
place at the high seas in order to establish the content of the definition and to determine
whether it covers modern-day piracy. The wording of Article 101 is thereby very clear just
defining an act of piracy when it occurred  
“[…](i) on the high seas, […];or […] in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State
[…]”107.
According to this wording, to enforce and prosecute piracy according to UNCLOS, piracy
must have occurred in a maritime zone outside the jurisdiction of any state. The problem is
that this requirement does not meet the most recent developments, as the IMO and IMB
statistics prove that modern-day piracy activities usually occur in territorial waters and
ports of a coastal state (often while the ship is berthed or anchored) and very seldom on the
high seas108. For special regions or areas, the “high seas” element applies, like for example
to Somali piracy. But the “high-seas requirement” is a severe limitation on Southeast Asian
piracy as most attacks there occur in narrow straits that fall within a nation’s territorial
seas109. Therefore, unless a coastal state has municipal legislation defining and punishing
piracy, the offenders will not be considered as pirates within the UNCLOS definition and
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therefore not be prosecuted for “piracy”110. The wording of Article 101 makes piracy an
international crime as violence committed against vessels within territorial or internal
waters is not piracy according to international law111. Therefore, the definition and
enforcement of piracy incidents is left with the coastal states in situations in which Article
101 would not apply.
The problem hereby is especially in case a country is unwilling or unable to control piracy
acts within its maritime zones (internal & territorial waters & contiguous zone & EEZ), the
question is whether the international community could intervene.
According to my view, this issue comes up as the term of “High Seas” within Article 101
has remained consistent, but the general jurisdictional landscape has changed in the last
years after drafting of UNCLOS112. The redefinition of the term of “High Seas” in the later
draft of UNCLOS to exclude the EEZ and archipelagic waters substantially reduced
theoretical jurisdiction over piracy as defined in international waters113. As the EEZ may
extend up to 200 miles from the baseline of the coastal state, areas like the Malacca Strait
would not be covered by Article 101114.
To answer the question, whether the international community could also intervene within
other maritime zones, it has to be looked into the further regulations of UNCLOS. Article
86 of the “High Seas Part VII” of UNCLOS which includes as well the piracy Article 101
states that
“The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State115.”
Seen that question from this wording, the answer would be “no”, but the second sentence
of Article 86 expands this limitation again by stating that
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“This Article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the
exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58116.”
And Article 58 para 2 of UNCLOS regulates that
“Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part117.”  
So, Article 58 para 2 of UNCLOS supports the application of Article 101 at least to the
EEZ as long as its application is not incompatible with Part V of UNCLOS on the EEZ118.
I cannot see that Article 101 would be incompatible, so this indicates therefore that Article
101 would also apply to the EEZ of a state and not just to the high sea, and I would thereby
follow the opinion of Barry Hart Dubner and Douglas Guilfoyle119. Critical on this view is,
that it has to be kept in mind, that any vessel apprehending a pirate in this zone, would
have to do so in a way that would not interfere with a coastal state’ rights, nor may it
constitute any threat to the security of the coastal state120.
After all, it can be mentioned that it would be better to clarify the definition of Article 101
already in the wording of this Article, and include therein as well piracy committed in
other maritime zones and not only on the high seas. Especially, as territorial and internal
waters are not included in Article 101, and there is no regulation within UNCLOS which
refers to it for territorial and internal waters. Due to this gap in international regulations,
there exists the opportunity, that piracy acts occurring in these waters go unpunished or
without redress121. Usually, if a foreign vessel will be under attack of pirates or terrorists in
the territorial waters of a state, the state whose flag the vessel is flying, is entitled
according to international law to demand that the other state in whose waters the incident
occurred, punish the pirates or terrorists or otherwise redress the act. But some states are
reluctant and if they would not follow the punishment requirement, they would be in
breach of its international obligations but this does not help to enforce and combat the
international fight against piracy although the victim state would have the normal remedies
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available for such international delict122. In my opinion, this gap in international laws
seems to be essential and has to be addressed for a legal change within the international
community.
2.2.3 SUA Convention
With regards to the Achille Lauro incident and the before mentioned gaps of Article 101 of
UNCLOS123, the UN General Assembly adopted in 1985 Resolution 40/61124.
This resolution requested the IMO
“to study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making
recommendations on appropriate measures125.”
Upon this request, the IMO adopted in 1988 the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (also “Rome Convention”)
whereby they clearly endeavored to establish a legal basis for prosecuting maritime
violence that did not fall within the UNCLOS piracy framework126. It became apparent,
that legal measures were necessary to prevent all modern-day piracy acts and to ensure that
perpetrators of such acts were made duly accountable. There was an important need for
piracy rules relating to the arrest, prosecution and subsequent detention of those
responsible for acts of maritime terrorism. The SUA Convention applies to ships
navigating or scheduled to navigate
“into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State,
or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States”127.
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The principal purpose of the SUA Convention was to enforce retribution and punishment
for maritime crimes and to ensure that appropriate judicial actions are taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against ships, which includes the seizure of ships by
force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board
a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it128. Furthermore, it should eliminate the
three above mentioned issues of Article 101 of UNCLOS129. The preamble of the
Convention thereby expresses a deep concern
“about the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or
take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the
dignity of human beings130
and the SUA Conventions is therefore also seen as “genuine” anti-terrorism Convention131.
It addressed terrorism at sea for the first time.
To eliminate the gaps of UNCLOS, as mentioned under chapter 2.2.1, Article 3 of the SUA
Convention contains a definition of piracy as an offense where a person unlawfully and
intentionally seizes or exercises control over a ship, performs an act of violence against a
person on board a ship, destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo, also
including destruction or damage to navigational facilities, or threatens to do so132.
Noticeably, Article 3 does not contain any provision for jurisdictional limitation for special
maritime zones. As well the motive requirement that UNCLOS contains in its “private
end” element is left out133. It can be agreed with other legal writers that the wording in the
SUA Convention makes no distinction between commercial or political motives134.
Rather, Article 9 of the SUA Convention spells out that
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“nothing in this Convention shall affect in any way the rules of international law pertaining
to the competence of States to exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board
ships not flying their flag.135”
The SUA Convention applies to ships
“navigating or […] scheduled to navigate into, through, or from waters beyond the outer
limit of the territorial sea of a single state, or [beyond] the lateral limits of its territorial sea
with adjacent states […] or [when] the alleged offender is found in the territory of a state
party136.”
Thus, the SUA Convention is applicable to ships on an international voyage operating or
scheduled to operate seaward of any state’s territorial sea137. It expands thereby the
definition of UNCLOS on piracy as it applies to any ship navigating to, through, or from
the territorial seas138. Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention encompasses criminal
actions committed during international transit, in ports, coastal zones or territorial
waters139.
Anyways, there are as well legal issues with the SUA Convention. An issue that arises out
of the SUA convention is its “extradite or prosecute” provision, which requires that the
countries that apprehend the offenders are restricted to performing either extradition or
prosecution140. Malvina Halberstam states that most legal writers see this requirement as
the “heart” of the SUA Convention141.
The “extradite or prosecute” requirement is regulated in Article 10 para 1 of the SUA
Convention and reads as follows:
“1. The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is found
shall, in cases to which Article 6 applies, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to
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submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take
their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature
under the law of the State.142”
According to the use of “shall” within this wording, the decision to prosecute and thereby
enforce the SUA Convention is discretionary for the states143. There is no absolute
obligation to extradite. It seems like the possibility of non-extradition for political offences
as well as the right to grant asylum are maintained144. The problem is that, according to this
regulation, when both, the coastal state and the potential state for prosecution refuse to
pursue action or neither state is a party to the Convention, the pirates or terrorists will have
impunity145. And unfortunately many states may not have treaties with those countries
normally targeted for piratical or terrorist acts making offenders captured in those countries
free from extradition unless the state agrees. Another problem is that the SUA Convention
is just applicable for the states which signed it. Therefore, according to the legal status of
the SUA Convention, a state would not have jurisdiction to prosecute unless the vessel
committing piracy had navigated through a signatory state’s territorial waters146. Thus far,
there are 156 countries147 that have subscribed to SUA, but it is fact that this mandatory
extradite or prosecute requirement deters many Southeast Asian states from ratifying it148.
Apart of – for example the Southeast Asian countries – there is also a general lack of
willingness by many other countries not to sign the SUA Convention. For example, general
“piracy-countries” like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines did not ratify the
Convention149. Therefore, in case pirates will stay out of the range of these countries which
are not a party to the SUA Convention, they can avoid any prosecution or extradition for
those offenses committed150.
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Furthermore, according to the legal writer Eugene Kontorovich and his research, even the
states which signed the SUA Convention, do not use it. The SUA Convention has
apparently only been used in one instance since its existence151.
Another problem with the interpretation and application of the treaty stated by Malvina
Halberstam is that some states interpret Article 10 of the SUA Convention so, that that
state, in which the offender is found, has an obligation to prosecute only if a request for
extradition is received152. And, in addition to this interpretation, some states have indicated
that under their domestic law they cannot prosecute without a request for extradition.
Halberstam states that the result of this opinion is that if jurisdiction is limited to the state
of nationality and to the flag state, and these states do not request extradition, the offender
may escape punishment, even if found in a state that would like to see him brought to
justice153. And according to the intention of the SUA Convention which is expressly
mentioned in its preamble, this cannot be the case. Halberstam’s view is correct as it is
very certain that this interpretation is not consistent with the legislative history of the SUA
Convention. During the negotiation process of the Convention, there has been made
proposals with regards to such a requirement, but it was rejected. So, the legislative history
does not leave any doubt that the obligation to submit the offender to competent authorities
is not dependant on a request for extradition154.
But even when this interpretation is wrong, it does not help if states are not willing to
become a party of the SUA Convention and to ratify it or the affected state refuses to start
any action. This is in my opinion very unsatisfactory. I agree with Halberstam that a
multilateral convention which is designed to deter and punish pirates and terrorists, should
provide the jurisdictional bases necessary to ensure that a state whose fundamental
interests are threatened by a maritime terrorist or piracy act, has the right to prosecute the
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perpetrators and that those who commit such acts do not escape punishment for lack of
jurisdiction by an interested state155.
As well, in my view it is right, that the wording of Article 10 of the SUA Convention does
not impose an absolute duty to punish because the state in whose territory the offender is
found is only required “to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution”, which “shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case
of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that state.156” So, the punishment
and enforcement of such piracy incidents is left with the states as described by the legal
writer Carlo Tiribelli: “States make the law, States break the law, States enforce the law157.
But the law of nations can only be as strong as the states themselves want it to be158.
According to the definition of the offence mentioned under point 2.2.1 of this thesis,
Article 3 of the SUA Convention deals with offences committed by natural persons. It does
not deal with offences that might be committed by Governments or states-sponsored
terrorism159. This is another lack in the regulations of the SUA Convention as it should
pursue all kind of piracy activities.
With regards to the question whether the SUA Convention covers all acts of modern-day
piracy, it has to be looked as well to Article 6 of the SUA Convention, which regulates that
“1. Each State Party shall take measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is committed:
(a)  Against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offence is
committed; or
(b)  in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or
(c)  by a national of that State.
2.    A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
(a)  it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or
(b) during its commission a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed; or
(c)  it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any
act160.”
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According to this wording, all these offences mentioned in Article 6 are limited to
activities that are directed against the ship per se (including its cargo), the safe navigation
of that ship, persons on board and maritime navigational facilities161. But this list does not
include activities on the high seas which are simply supportive of terrorist acts. Hence, it
does not affect terrorist activities which are not sufficiently precise to be considered as
piracy162. The problem is that there is not yet an internationally uniform definition of
piracy which could be included in the wording of Article 6 of the SUA Convention163.
After all, it can be seen that the SUA Convention does not aim at prevention, deterrence or
suppression of those piracy or maritime terrorism activities before they occur. And, also
the SUA Convention lacks in some parts of its regulations, and therefore – in my opinion-
cannot be seen as an overall legal solution to combat the new and steady developing trends
of piracy and maritime terrorism. Especially, as the SUA Convention is just binding for the
state parties who signed it. Thus, the SUA Convention – like UNCLOS – seems to be
ineffective to clearly cover and combat modern-day piracy occurring on seas today.
2.2.4 Protocol of 2005 to the SUA Convention
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became obvious that the 1988
SUA Convention required a revision and an update because the SUA Convention was
focusing more on reactions to a terrorist attack rather than its prevention164. The IMO
decided in November 2001 to update the SUA Convention165. So, the original 1988 SUA
Convention and Protocol, was amended respectively by two 2005 SUA Protocols. The
legal framework of that Protocol is set by the relevant international legal instruments
against terrorism as well as UNCLOS and the “customary international law of the sea”166.
With this wording and the reference to customary law, the drafters wanted to widen up the
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scope of the SUA Convention so that the regulations are applicable as well to states which
have not yet signed or ratified the SUA Convention.
The core regulation of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention is Article 3 bis (1a)
which reads as following:
“1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person
unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act:
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive
material or BCN167 weapon and other nuclear explosive devices – in a manner that
causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious
substance, in such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or
serious injury or damage;
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; or
(iv) threatens to commit any of these offences168.”
A problem of this core regulation is that its wording just attempts to define some aspects of
international terrorism on sea (“to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”), but there is still no
comprehensive definition of maritime terrorism or modern-day piracy. Also, the wording
“unlawfully and intentionally” is not defined. Again, this is leading to interpretation
problems and legal issues. For example, the question is what is meant by “intentionally”
when it comes to seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships,
and the placing of devices on board a ship which is likely to destroy or damage it169. The
same happens with the wording “unlawfully”. It is not clear whether “unlawfully” refers to
unlawful acts under international or national laws.
Like the SUA Convention, also the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention is only
binding to state parties who signed it. The maritime states which are most affected by
piracy are non-signatories to either the SUA Convention or its protocols, or none of the
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instruments at all170. Therefore, similar to the SUA Convention, according to my opinion,
the amendments with the 2005 Protocol are so long ineffective as it does not bind the entire
international community. So, its impact to the international fight against piracy is very
little and -  apart from that – I believe, the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol remain
still more a reactive rather than a preventative nature with regards to piracy and maritime
terrorism.
2.3 Existing Legal Regulations from a National Perspective
As already described in the before mentioned chapter, apart from these international
regulations, customary international law authorizes as well each state to prosecute piracy
activities occurring within their territory based on their national criminal code. Due to the
location of the piracy crime itself, and due to the fact that most states do not have the
resources or are unwilling to respond effectively to a pirate attack, it is the coastal state
which is the most appropriate entity to combat piracy171. In the territorial sea, other states
than the coastal state do not have any jurisdiction for enforcement measures against
piracy172. For centuries, nations have deemed pirates to be “hostis generis” (= enemies of
all mankind), so that a state may use its own domestic laws to try to punish those
committing piracy, regardless of the pirates’ nationalities or where the piratical acts took
place173. As “enemies of mankind” it is recognized in customary international law, that
states could exercise universal jurisdiction because the pirate commits hostilities upon the
subjects and property of any and all nations, without regard to right or duty, or any
pretence of public authority174.
The following chapter will examine whether national regulations are comprehensive
enough and whether states use their own existing internal jurisdiction and criminal law
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codes to combat against modern-day piracy and maritime terrorism within their own
maritime zone.
2.4 Identifying Gaps in National Laws
Since piratical activities occur generally within regional boundaries, a logical counter
would be to establish regional international agreements to combat piracy175. But the ability
of states to suppress piracy is limited by international law, which promotes only individual
state actions against pirates and makes no provision to encourage, much less coordinate,
effective anti-piracy enforcement176. Although UNCLOS requires that 
“all states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the
high seas”177,
no international authority has been named or established to ascertain whether or not a state
meets its obligation178.
As mentioned above, from a national perspective, due to the location of the piracy act,
national criminal codes of each state could apply as far as there are regulations included
regarding piracy. In the territorial sea, other states than the coastal states do not have any
jurisdiction for enforcement measures against piracy179. One legal problem hereby is, that
many criminal codes do not themselves define “piracy” or the “piracy act”, but merely
provide for jurisdictions over those committing piracy “as defined by the law of the
nations”180. For example, China has no special anti-piracy laws but prosecutes piracy under
its general criminal code181. Australia has – in contrary to China – incorporated all of
UNCLOS’s piracy provisions into Part IV of its Crimes Act of 1914182. The same did the
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United States. They have enacted the majority of the provisions of SUA in their 18 U.S.C.
§ 2280183.
But when the national criminal code does not define the act of piracy or does not provide a
separate single regulation for piracy acts, other existing criminal code regulations have to
be interpreted by states. These gaps in national criminal laws put the burden of
interpretation and definition of piracy upon national judges respectively the municipal
legal systems. As customary international law provides no agreed-upon definition for what
acts constitute the international crime of piracy, the affected states have to decide and
interpret the internationally orientated definition of the offence and they do it differently184.
Furthermore, national courts may not have sufficient legal capacity or expertise to
adjudicate serious crimes of international concern.
Another legal problem in my view is occurring by the fact that in regions which involve a
multitude of coastal states, pirates may escape a patrol boat of one coastal state simply by
entering the territorial seas of another coastal state which is maybe unwilling to respond to
a pirate attack and would then object to any enforcement measure by other states185. So,
even states which have the necessary resources and procedures to prosecute piracy,
political reasons may prevent a pirates’ prosecution. For example, it has been examined
that the states bordering the Malacca Strait are very reluctant to let other states undertake
patrols in their territorial sea (especially patrols of the US navy and coast guard)186.
In Somalia – an area where currently most of pirate attacks occur - no governmental patrol
boats are controlling its coastal waters although piracy represents a considerable
international problem in its waters. As Christopher Joyner states it correctly in his legal
article, with no operating official maritime policy presence at all – i.e., no coast guard,
naval presence, patrol boats, defensive armaments, or staff training – the level of
lawlessness in Somali waters is bound to grow187.
                                               
183 Violence Against Maritime Navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1996).
184Carlo Tiribelli, supra note 27, at 140.
185 Luft & Korin, supra note 26, at 69.
186 Rothwell & Stephens, supra note 30, at 23.
187 Christopher Joyner, Law & Ethics, Navigating Troubled Waters – Somalia, Piracy, and
Maritime Terrorism, In: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, Issue 1,
(summer/fall2009), pp. 83, at 85.
37
Besides, it can be reported that even in such states like the United Kingdom, pirates of
certain nationalities will not be prosecuted, as the United Kingdom asylum laws might
allow the offender to remain in the country indefinitely after trial. The British Foreign
Office in London has stated in a legal opinion that Somalian pirates who would be subject
to harsh treatment in Somalia cannot be deported as this would be against the British
Human Rights Act188. The same applies to Portugal. The Portuguese government only
arrests pirates when Portuguese nationals or ships are involved189. Thus, instead of
bringing pirates to justice, a culture of impunity reigns, with captured pirates being
released and permitted to continue their illegal activities190. Particularly Western states are
avoiding their duty to prosecute pirates because of fears that – if convicted – those pirates
will then seek political asylum for themselves and their families. Though, no country
would be eager to have to import pirate clans191.
According to these facts, it seems like most states are shunning their judicial responsibility
to prosecute the pirates who commit crimes in their territory or against their ships and
crews. And the reasons for this refusal are – like mentioned above - many: Inadequate or
non-existent national laws criminalizing the acts committed, concerns about the safety and
impartiality of local judges, the difficulties of obtaining and preserving evidence, and fears
that if convicted, the pirates will be able to remain in the country where they are
prosecuted192. Due to these facts and situation, it is very obvious to me that - besides the
international regulations on piracy - neither the national systems do work and are not
prepared to combat the new developments of modern-day piracy.
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3 Future Prospects and Tendencies of Development of International Regulations
against Modern-Day Piracy
As examined in the before mentioned chapter, many states do not have laws that would
permit them to prosecute piracy offenses, either because they have not incorporated the
provisions of UNCLOS or the SUA Convention, or because they do not have domestic
laws that criminalize piracy. In both documents – UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, the
United Nations have limited its member nations’ ability to respond to pirate attacks by
preventing foreign incursions into the sovereign waters of another nation and thereby
effectively crippling any opportunity to wage a fight against piracy193.
Another reason I believe is, that they are – simply said – unwilling or lazy to prosecute
piracy. Besides, the current international regulations with regards to piracy have failed to
evolve to reflect the times and places limitations on those who can best combat the pirate
crisis, the pirate’ victims and private entrepreneurs194. As verified before, “piracy” – the
world’s oldest crime against the law of nations – does not have an easily applied and
universally accepted definition195. This is one of the core problems in my view.
Nevertheless, the need for regional cooperation with respect to greater efforts toward
coordinated anti-piracy patrols is one universally agreed upon goal196. This in particular as
many nations – like Somalia – that are located in “piracy territories” would be unequipped
to prosecute piracy cases even if they had sufficient laws on their books. They simply do
not have the political stability, institutions, or personnel to allow them to investigate and
fairly adjudicate such matters197.
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After all, the question is whether an international “criminal code” for piracy needs to be
established. Besides, it is clear to myself that in order to successfully combat piracy and
maritime terrorism, international assistance and cooperation is required.
3.1 Current Legal Development and Discussions from a Global Perspective
As described in this thesis, international treaty and customary law provide for a narrow
basis under which pirates can be apprehended on the high seas or elsewhere. Whether a
pirate can be prosecuted depends on where the pirate is captured, the nationality of the
pirate, the nationality of the ship that arrests him and the circumstances under which the
pirate is arrested198. Therefore, the international community discusses whether an
international new treaty with regards to piracy is required and could solve these problems.
Joseph M. Isanga states that fundamental to the discussion of establishment of a new
international legal treaty with regards to the piracy crime is an agreed-upon definition of
what is the crime, who are the offenders, and who may prosecute them199. As long as
coastal states have no obligation to enact domestic laws aimed at combating acts
considered to be piracy under international law, the piracy threat will remain and increase.
The lack of uniformity in the definition of piracy throughout the world, in conjunction with
the complete absence of any definition of piracy in some countries, will continue to impede
efforts to reduce incidents of piracy. Therefore, I agree with Isanga, there is a need for an
overall accepted definition of piracy which applies to all possible form of this crime, and
that the improvement of domestic laws, especially those pertaining to jurisdiction over
piracy, is vital to ensure an effective enforcement regime200.  This problem could be solved
by establishing an international code on piracy applicable to all states to harmonize several
important legal structures on an international level. But, I believe, that it is questionable
hereby whether to establish a new international code or whether better to expand the
existing definitions and provisions in UNCLOS. Many commentators have suggested to
extend the regime of piracy to territorial waters in UNCLOS but in such a way that a costal
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state’s sovereignty would continue to be respected201. Modifications of UNCLOS can be
done according to Article 311 of UNCLOS which provides that two or more state parties
may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation of provisions of this
Convention, applicably solely between them202. I agree that it would be easier to expand
and extent the already existing regime of piracy in the UNCLOS provisions than
establishing a totally new international code on piracy crime.
In addition to the need of a revision of international regulations on piracy, it is considered
in the international law community to establish a coinciding international crimes court just
for piracy acts, an international court of justice for piracy. Article 105 of UNCLOS
provides thereby the following provision:
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control
of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also
determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith203.”
and authorizes with it for any state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft and its property on
board, arrest the crew, and prosecute them through its own courts, as long as the seizure
takes place on the high seas or on waters outside the jurisdiction of any state. But, there is
again the problem, that UNCLOS does not provide a comprehensive definition what
“piracy” means and Article 105 is again just limited to actions on the “high seas”.
Furthermore, the “may- wording” of Article 105 does not make it obligatory for the states
to take jurisdictional action204. And: This option has not been exercised much by states in
the last years. Milena Sterio states in her legal article, that the reasons for this vary, but
often there is only domestic criminal prosecution of pirates in place, the cost factors is too
high for many states or states just simply want to avoid the hassle associated with
prosecuting pirates because of fear that piracy trials will be difficult, lengthy, and
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burdensome on that nation’s  judiciary205. I believe that it is usual behavior of nations not
to be interested to play the role of the global policeman on piracy and to takeover sole
responsibility. Therefore, in recent years, several ad hoc tribunals (e.g. International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Iraqi High Courts) have been established and some nations
transferred captured pirates to regional partners like Kenya206. But the acceptance of ad hoc
tribunals for piracy prosecution is questionable. An ad hoc piracy tribunal needs an
appropriate housing and detention facility, a trained judiciary, prosecution and defense
counsel and to develop a uniform piracy law that would be applied to all captured
pirates207. With regards to transfer of captured pirates to regional partnerships for their
prosecution, the legality of such transfers to third parties is not given under international
law as it is not provided for in Article 105 of UNCLOS (“The courts of the State which
carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the
action to be taken…”)208. While the SUA Convention allows such transfers of pirates to
third-party states, there is again the problem that many countries are not members of the
SUA Convention209.
Besides, I see the problem that it could be, that the capturing nation is bound by various
human rights conventions and therefore may not transfer pirates to third states if there is a
risk that pirates will be tortured in such third states or that they will not receive a fair trial.
Piracy cases ought to be tried in courts that are sufficiently equipped to handle piracy
cases210.
Therefore, it is proposed to establish a permanent International Piracy Tribunal, modeled
after the International Criminal court (ICC) with special piracy jurisdiction. Some other
legal writers, like Yvonne M. Dutton, propose instead of this possibility to just expand the
jurisdiction of the ICC. For this expansion, the Statute of the ICC would have to be
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amended to include the specific crime of piracy211. The establishment of a special
international criminal court for piracy has been criticized because if leaves the crime of
piracy under the domain of traditional universal jurisdiction, which would permit any state
to prosecute suspected pirates regardless of their nationality212. Yvonne M. Dutton states
correctly that the expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction on piracy would be less costly than
the establishment of an entirely new international tribunal to adjudicate piracy cases213.
Indeed, it would be maybe more practicable to create a separate chamber at the ICC to
ensure that piracy cases would be investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated by those with
the necessary expertise.214 In the contrary, Helmut Tuerk (vice president of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)) states that the ICC has been
established to prosecute individuals for crimes for a much more serious nature than piracy,
i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression215. Tuerk
therefore believes that the ICC would not be suitable for dealing with common criminals
like pirates in cases where national tribunals are unwilling or unable to prosecute them. In
addition, he reminds that the amendment of the statutes of the ICC would undoubtedly
require a number of years216. In any case, I would not agree with these opinions of Tuerk,
but I would agree that if there would be established a special chamber for pirates at the
ICC, this requires time as the court judges would need to develop their expertise in
maritime laws. Besides, it creates further costs. The same would be the case by
establishing an entire new International Tribunal. Another discussion is whether the ITLOS
should prosecute pirates217. ITLOS is already a functional tribunal and the judges are
already trained on maritime laws. Thus, no additional training would be needed and no
additional personnel costs incurred by any nation. In that case, ITLOs statute would need
to be amended to face as well the crimes of piracy but commentators believe that this
process would be less difficult than that needed to amend the ICC statute218. In my opinion,
this would be the best solution to create an effective international tribunal on piracy
crimes.
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As described before, lacking national and regional enforcement capability, Western navies
are absolutely necessary to quell the rise of piracy. The United Nations Security Council as
well as the IMO are in charge of organizing and implementing relevant naval control and
enforcement measures, especially for certain piracy affected regions and they should use
this capacity more effectively.
The United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions in 2007 and 2008
regarding piracy in Somalia. Resolution 1772 of 2007 stresses the importance of
cooperation between the opposing factions in Somalia and reiterates the need for
comprehensive and lasting cessation of hostilities219. But the most significant resolution of
the UNSC was resolution 1816 which authorizes any and all countries combating piracy
off the Somali coast to engage pirates on land or sea provided that there is advance consent
by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (hereby it has to be mentioned that the
Somali TGF is nearly non-functional, therefore it is very questionable whether this
condition of advance consent is sensible, it seems to be more a political diplomatically
action)220. So, with this resolution, the UNSC made a legal exception by authorizing
cooperating states to take the same steps with respect to piracy in the Somali territorial sea
as the law of piracy permits on the high seas. Furthermore, the UNSC has endorsed actions
by Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and other NATO forces to send warships to the Gulf of Aden region to
combat pirates221. As well in Resolution 1846, the UNSC noted that the SUA Convention
“provides for parties to create criminal offenses, establish jurisdiction, and accept the
delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship
by force or threat [of force] or any other form of intimidation222”
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and thus urged state parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations
under the Convention, including cooperating with the IMO to
“build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.”
With regards to these recent and ongoing resolutions of the UNSC, the UNSC has been
successful in identifying the scope of Somali piracy and encouraging a coordinated
international response, but its “real” effectiveness is questionable. While the UNSC
resolutions have been helpful in combating piracy in some respects, they have not been
provided adequate legal guideposts to foreign navies. According to my view, there is still
the legal issue whether Western navies are allowed to act over the international law and the
permissible extent of the use of their force223. The UNSC resolutions treat the enforcement
jurisdiction exercised by foreign navies over pirates in Somali territorial seas as an
exception to international customary law and not as a status quo224. In addition, these naval
operations tend to be ad hoc and defensive in nature, but they fail to focus on remedying
the political instability that allows piracy in these most affected regions225. Whether states
which are parties to the SUA Convention are cooperative enough to establish a regional
tribunal court on the basis of multilateral agreements and with the UN participation is as
well more than questionable. This, although Article 100 of UNCLOS imposes one duty
alone on states regarding piracy: “Cooperation”. Anyways, Article 100 of UNCLOS does
not provide any detail on the nature of such cooperation226. But without any guidance of
cooperation by an international body, states will have difficulties to organize a global
cooperation to combat piracy from an overall perspective.
As well the IMO is reacting on the piracy threat but the results should be critically
observed. The IMO’s initiatives have resulted in the establishment of several regional and
sub-regional arrangements aimed at preventing, deterring, and repressing acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships.
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In January 2009, the IMO held a meeting to conclude four resolutions: The most important
resolution 1 – The Djibouti Code of Conduct – requires cooperation in a manner consistent
with international law in the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of those reasonably
suspected having committed acts of piracy, the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships,
the rescue and care of ships, persons, and property subject to piracy, and a shared patrol227.
Additionally, the IMO implemented in 2009 two important sets of guidelines for a more
effective fight against piracy. One was an update of the IMO’s guidance on combating
piracy and armed robbery against ships and adopted a set of “best management practices”
to deter such attacks228. These guidelines include several recommendations related to
certain travel routes and more technical advice regarding preferred modes of
communication and reporting, evasive maneuvering tactics, and other defensive
measures229. The other adoption was on a guidance document in the form of a Code of
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships to
foster international cooperation and to coordinate governments’ actions230. Any decrease in
piracy attacks cannot be seen for the time being. In practice, for me it is questionable
whether such guidelines for best management practices to deter piracy attacks really help
ship-owners and vessels in case of a piracy incident. Therefore it has to be kept in mind
that there are as well the discussions to amend the provisions of UNCLOS and to allow
crews on vessels to arm themselves and to allow them to use similar weapons like the one
of pirates and to train them to effectively use them. This view is supported by the IMB as
they believe ships and crews in known pirate waters must be armed in proportion to the
seriousness of the piracy threat the waters pose231. They propose to include to UNCLOS
the following provision:
                                               
227 Katie Smith Matison, supra note 4, at 385; IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden, Annex, IMO Council Doc. C 102/14 (April 03, 2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf
228 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia: Best
Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Off the Coast of Somalia
Developed by the Industry, ¶¶ 5-6, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1335 (September 29, 2009).
229 Ved P. Nanda, supra note 204, at 188.
230 Ibid; IMO, Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships, Annex, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26), (January 18, 2010).
231 Ethan C. Stiles, supra note 194, at 313.
46
“A State shall have the right to arm any ship flying its flag with sufficient arms to protect
its ships in any territory governed by this Convention232.”
Apart of this, if such a provision would be included in UNCLOS regulations upon piracy,
it needs also to provide limits and guidance on this privilege to bear arms on vessels which
are not warships or naval vessels. Ethan C. Stiles reminds that by allowing an arming of
crews, there should be a legal requirement to file an inventory, to send inspectors to board
and inspect the ship’s weapon inventories and some further control actions need to be
implemented to prevent misuse of arms and weapons on board and in ports as well as any
damage to third parties233. I see as well the danger that such kind of weapons could be
misused and usually violation will be answered with violation. It could be that arming of
ship crews could create more violence while a piracy incident and let it easier escalate.
Therefore, I would have doubts whether such measures would help to limit the increase in
piracy threat.
3.2 Conclusion and General Assessment of Past and Future Legal Developments
and Regulations
After all, the international community appears to understand the severity of the problem of
modern piracy and also that it will not go away unless the international community takes
aggressive action to combat it234.
As stated in this thesis, at present, no treaty expressly requires states to criminalize piracy,
no agreement has been reached on what such laws should contain and no international
court has overall jurisdiction to try pirates. The existing international law of piracy imposes
no specific duties to prosecute or enact domestic law criminalizing piracy, tough it does
provide states with various kinds of authority to assist in the repression of piracy235.
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The presence of international navies may sometimes deter pirates, but navies are for
fighting wars; they are neither pirate chasers nor can they be everywhere all the time to
suppress every piratical act236. When asked about the presence of foreign military within
Somalia’s territorial waters, a Somali pirate replied:
“We are not scared of the U.S. troops or any other troops stationed off our waters. Why
should we be scared ? […] They have weapons, but so do we. And we are the ones with the
human shields237.”
I believe that the problem should be met where it starts. Hence, once it is established why
people engage in piracy and maritime terrorism, it is then possible to develop a
comprehensive strategy for resolving the problem238. This is how an anonymous Somali
pirate highlighted the interconnectivity of violence, piracy and a lack of governmental
reaction:
“I am Somali; the gun is our government239.”
To make a long story short: After all discussions, the inability of states to police their own
waters, the depressed economic conditions that give rise to crime, and the geographical and
jurisdictional difficulties of policing states’ waters combine to encourage piracy. 
Therefore, in my opinion, it is essential that states cooperate in the repression of piracy
under Article 100 of UNCLOS. States which have not yet criminalized acts of piracy in
their domestic legislation or provided the necessary authorization under the pertinent
international conventions and customary international law to prosecute and punish
suspected pirates must do so as a matter of priority240. Bringing pirates to justice is
essential for its deterrent effect. Prosecutions must be done in compliance with widely
recognized principles of due process and applicable international human rights norms.
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As shown in the chapter before, some commentators propose that pirates should be
prosecuted at the place in the region where the piracy act was committed because of
cultural, familial and linguistic considerations and the proximity to where the acts took
place. I think this will again lead to uncontrolled enforcement acts and jurisdictional
differences between countries which is unlikely to combat piracy on a comprehensive
approach. Apart of that, it is unlikely that a national court would be located close to the
offense and the evidences necessary to prosecute it. Pirate attacks usually involve
perpetrators, victims and witnesses of many nationalities241. Just an international court
would be able to provide justice that is fairer and more impartial than justice in national
courts, given that the judges will not be linked to the state where the crime was committed
or the defendants that committed that crime. Furthermore, an international court on piracy
can apply international laws and rules and thereby ensures as well the uniformity in the
application of laws and the sentencing of offenders242. As piracy affects not just one nation
but rather the international community it is the kind of crime over which an international
criminal court could properly pass judgement on behalf of the world community. In any
case, whether a new international crime court will be implemented or the existing ICC’s or
ITLOS’ authority will be expanded on piracy, there is a certain need for such a tribunal.
Finally, piracy as well as terrorism thrives in disordered states, war-torn regions, and
impoverished areas. Piracy-fighting countries may need to undertake additional efforts to
rebuild such states and regions and to ensure that such lawlessness does not occur in other
regions in the world. Thus, the best long-term solution against the crime of piracy may be
the developed world’s commitment to re-establishing functioning order in developing and
failed states243.
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